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Conference Presentations and the Disclosure Milieu 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Conference presentations differ from other voluntary disclosures in that the audience for the 
disclosure is co-located with managers in a well-defined physical and social setting, or 
“disclosure milieu.”  The milieu affects the degree to which conference participants can update 
their prior beliefs about the firm with information signals obtained through interactions with 
management and other informed participants.  While the average abnormal stock return and 
volume reactions to presentations are positive, there is a great deal of cross-sectional variation as 
indicated by negative median reactions.  We find that conference characteristics that determine 
the nature of the audience and its interactions, such as sponsor, location, size, and industry-focus, 
are significantly associated with the market reaction, consistent with the disclosure milieu 
explaining the cross-sectional variation in the information content of the presentation.  We also 
find that conference characteristics explain changes in subsequent analyst and institutional 
investor following, consistent with the disclosure milieu creating differences in access to 
management by potential new investors and analysts.        
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1. Introduction 
Conference presentations are a prevalent form of managerial communication, providing 
one of the few settings that allow face-to-face interactions among managers, investors, analysts, 
and other stakeholders.  Conferences typically bring together a large number of companies to the 
same location for a series of presentations to an audience invited by the conference sponsor.  As 
a result of this co-location, conference presentations differ from other types of voluntary 
disclosure, such as press releases and conference calls, because they occur within a well-defined 
physical and social setting, which we refer to as the “disclosure milieu.”  Each conference setting 
creates a disclosure milieu that determines the composition of the audience and the extent of the 
interactions among managers and the audience in the same place and time as the manager makes 
the disclosure.  We predict that the disclosure milieu influences the ability of participants to 
revise their beliefs about the firm and, hence, the market reaction to the presentation. 
Prior work suggests that the audience for a disclosure could affect its information content 
due to differences in investors’ private information, consensus in beliefs, and ability to interpret 
disclosures (Holthausen and Verrecchia [1990], Indjejikian [1991], Kim and Verrecchia [1994]).  
The disclosure milieu heightens these potential audience effects by bringing together participants 
with private information to the same location and facilitating information transfers through 
explicit discussions with managers and other participants, higher-order belief formation, and 
assessment of nonverbal cues.  Thus, the milieu affects the degree to which participants can 
Bayesian update their prior beliefs about the firm with information signals obtained from 
management and other participants before, during, and after the presentation.  In the conference 
setting, the disclosure milieu is determined by conference characteristics such as sponsor, 
location, size, and industry-focus.  We use a sample of 95,105 conference presentations that 
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exhibit cross-sectional variation in these characteristics to test whether the disclosure milieu 
predictably explains the absolute stock return and share turnover reaction to the presentations 
and the subsequent changes in following by institutional investors and analysts.  
Conference presentations typically last less than an hour and include a mix of prepared 
remarks and question and answer periods.  While Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) does not 
preclude limited-access presentations, managers are still subject to selective disclosure 
restrictions (Cooley Godward [2000]).  Presentations are not tied to another major information 
event (e.g., earnings announcements) because conference sponsors must schedule the conference 
well in advance and at a time when a large number of managers can attend.  As a result, the goal 
of the conference presentation is often to provide a broader, more qualitative view of the firm’s 
strategy and operations.  Managers have incentives to present at conferences to improve the 
firm’s visibility; to meet the demands of stakeholders for access to top management; to solidify 
business relationships with the conference sponsor; and to avoid negative attributions that could 
arise from failing to attend a conference at which most of the firm’s peers are represented. 
We measure the information content of the presentation using abnormal absolute returns 
and abnormal share turnover in the three days around the presentation.  We find significant mean 
increases in abnormal absolute returns and turnover during the presentation window that 
represent 5-10% increases over the prior 90-day estimation period.   However, the median values 
are negative (and larger in magnitude in the case of absolute returns) because only 40-45% of the 
firms experience greater absolute returns and turnover than in the estimation period.   The cross-
sectional variation in these univariate effects is not surprising because managers generally do not 
disclose new information during presentations; rather, most of the information content comes 
 3 
from the private information of the audience.  Our examination of the disclosure milieu 
highlights the factors that drive these cross-sectional differences in market response. 
We use the conference sponsor, location, size, and industry-focus to measure differences 
in the disclosure milieu.  We find that the disclosure milieu is significantly associated with the 
information content of the presentation, controlling for a large number of firm characteristics and 
for concurrent information releases.  Presentations at conferences sponsored by product market 
intermediaries and top brokerage firms exhibit greater market reactions than conferences hosted 
by small brokerage firms, analyst societies, stock exchanges, and IR firms.  For product market 
conferences, this finding is consistent with management having incentives to disclose new 
information to business partners and with the presence of an audience with product-specific 
private information.  For top brokerages, the result is consistent with their conferences attracting 
a larger pool of sophisticated investors with greater potential private information.   
We also find that presentations at conferences held in money centers and destination 
resorts generate more information content than those held in other US cities or outside the US.  
Information content is also positively associated with conference size.  The results for money 
center and large conferences reflect a larger audience of sophisticated investors with greater 
private information and more higher-order belief formation.  While destination conferences 
typically draw smaller crowds, they allow for more interactions among the participants who 
remain at the venue longer; thus, this finding reflects increased information content arising from 
the intensity of interactions.  Presentations at industry-focused conferences convey more 
information than at broad conferences, consistent with the audience having more industry-
specific private information that can facilitate information transfers across presentations.  
 4 
Combined, these results show that the disclosure milieu affects the information content of the 
presentation, highlighting the role of the audience and its interactions in the disclosure process.    
Next, we examine how the disclosure milieu affects changes in following by analysts and 
institutional investors.  We control for the information content of the presentation so that the 
composition of the audience and its interactions will be the major determinants of whether a 
presentation attracts new analysts and investors.  We find that analysts are more likely to 
increase following of firms presenting at industry-focused conferences, consistent with the 
industry-based structure of analyst coverage.  Analysts are less likely to increase following after 
presentations at product market conferences or top brokerage conferences, consistent with 
analysts not being the target audience in either of these settings.  Product market conferences are 
not structured to facilitate interactions between managers and analysts, and top brokerage 
conferences generally exclude analysts from competing brokerage firms. 
Institutional investors are more likely to increase ownership of firms presenting at 
conferences hosted by top brokerage firms and at large conferences.  These results suggest that 
institutional investors are more likely to attend conferences that provide preferential access to a 
large number of firms, thus reducing the costs of learning about these firms and their managers.
1
  
Moreover, the finding that top brokerage conferences are associated with larger changes in 
institutional ownership, but smaller changes in analyst coverage, provides strong evidence that 
the disclosure milieu (e.g., access to management) drives the results, rather than an omitted 
factor correlated with both conference characteristics and following by analysts and investors.  
This paper contributes to the voluntary disclosure literature by providing evidence that 
the physical and social setting in which a disclosure takes place—the “disclosure milieu”—
                                                 
1
 As further evidence of the importance of access to management, Bushee, Jung, and Miller [2011] find that 
investors tend to execute larger, more profitable trades during periods when they have direct, private access to 
managers.  They also find that this result is distinct from the milieu effects shown in this paper.    
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influences the market reaction to disclosure.  Unlike most verbal or written disclosures, 
conference presentations occur within a disclosure milieu that determines the audience and its 
degree of interactions.  In doing so, the milieu affects the nature and degree of private 
information that is impounded into price through mechanisms such as higher-order beliefs and 
nonverbal cues that can only be obtained through co-location of managers and other informed 
participants.  The milieu also affects the firm’s ability to attract new analysts and institutional 
investors by influencing the pool of participants and their access to management.  Our findings 
suggest that examining the disclosure milieu could provide new insights into the market response 
to voluntary disclosure.   
The next section reviews prior literature and provides some background on conferences 
to motivate our predictions.  Section 3 describes the sample and defines the variables used in the 
analyses.  We present results on the stock return and trading volume reactions to presentations in 
Section 4 and on changes in institutional investor and analyst following subsequent to 
presentations in Section 5.  We offer conclusions in Section 6. 
 
2. Motivation and Predictions 
2.1 Prior Literature 
A large literature finds significant effects of voluntary disclosure on stock returns, trading 
volume, and following by analysts and institutional investors.  Much of this literature focuses on 
written disclosures or disclosure indices (e.g., Lev and Penman [1990], Skinner [1994], Lang and 
Lundholm [1996a], Healy, Hutton, and Palepu [1999], Bushee and Noe [2000], Hutton, Miller 
and Skinner [2003]).  Studies of conference calls provide evidence that interactive verbal 
communications are an important source of information for investors and analysts (Frankel, 
Johnson and Skinner [1999], Bowen, Davis and Matsumoto [2002], Bushee, Matsumoto and 
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Miller [2003], [2004]).  However, in conference calls, there is no possibility for interaction 
before or after the call, and managers can control the queuing of questioners to reward or punish 
analysts (Mayew [2008]).   
 In recent years, managers have increasingly added conferences presentations to their 
disclosure activities (Jackson [2007]).  Despite the growth in conferences, only one published 
study examines these presentations.  Francis, Hanna, and Philbrick [1997] examine a sample of 
1,199 presentations to the New York Society of Security Analysts during the nascent period for 
management presentations (1986-1992).  They find significant positive returns on the day of the 
presentation, particularly for undervalued firms, consistent with the presentation mitigating 
visibility issues.  They also find an increase in analyst following after the presentation, but no 
relation with forecast accuracy.  These findings indicate the information potential of conference 
presentations.   However, because the common conference format at the time was a single 
sponsor and location with generally few firms presenting in each conference, there was no 
opportunity to study cross-sectional variation in the audience or its degree of interactivity.   
2.2 Conference Presentations 
Subsequent to the Francis, et al. [1997] sample period, the number and variety of 
organizations sponsoring conferences have grown substantially.  Between 1999 and 2007, there 
were over 95,000 presentations at more than 5,400 conferences hosted by over 800 
organizations.  Meanwhile, the number of analyst society conferences has declined over time 
dropping from 6% of our sample in 1999 to 1% in 2007.  Most conferences are now hosted by 
analysts through their brokerage firms.
2
 
                                                 
2
 By sponsoring their own conferences, analysts can provide access to only the brokerage firm’s best clients.  A 
recent survey indicated that one-third of the commission payments used to compensate brokerage firms is to reward 
brokers for corporate access, including the facilitation of meetings with company management and invitations to 
conferences (Greenwich Associates [2010]). 
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Conferences are publicized weeks in advance and are generally by invitation only.  Reg 
FD does not preclude limited-access conferences; however managers are still subject to 
restrictions on selective disclosure of material information.
3
  To comply with Reg FD, companies 
often provide webcasts and/or concurrent public releases (e.g., Form 8-K filings).  Presentations 
typically last 30 to 45 minutes and consist of management making prepared remarks and then 
taking questions.   These presentations focus on a more overarching view of the company and its 
strategy, without having to explain a recent information event.
4
  Presentations also help 
managers develop a commitment to transparency through face-to-face interactions, which many 
IR professionals view as the most crucial part of a firm’s communication strategy (Bushee and 
Miller [Forthcoming]).  Participants attending a conference potentially gain more information 
than those who only listen to webcasts because their co-location with managers and other 
participants allows them to assess the veracity of managers’ statements through visual and verbal 
cues, to judge other participants’ reactions to the discussion, and to continue conversations with 
managers and other participants outside of the presentation.
5
   
The co-location of managers and participants creates a “disclosure milieu” in which the 
audience and its interactions affect the information content of the presentation.  Prior work 
suggests that the audience for a disclosure could affect its information content due to differences 
                                                 
3
 The SEC does not define “material information” and firms have some latitude to discuss details of the business to 
fill in the “mosaic” of information without violating Reg FD (Cooley Godward [2000]).  In 2005, a district court 
judge dismissed a Reg FD action against Siebel Systems, saying (in part) “Regulation FD does not require that 
corporate officials only utter verbatim statements that were previously publicly made.”  Further, the judge argued 
that “Although stock movement is a relevant factor to be considered in making the determination as to materiality, it 
is not, however, a sufficient factor alone to establish materiality” and that “the actions taken by those in attendance 
at the speaking engagement, although a relevant consideration, do not change the nature or content of statements” 
(SEC v. Siebel Systems, et al. [2005]).  This ruling shows the difficultly in determining if Reg FD has been violated.   
4
 As one asset manager put it, “what we're trying to do is build a jigsaw puzzle…[we] don't go to conferences to be 
told how much a company is going to earn next quarter. [We] go to uncover the fundamentals of the company…and 
trends that will change dynamics in the industry five years ahead” (Dow Jones Newswires [2001]). 
5
 Consistent with the importance of co-location, attempts to hold “virtual” conferences have failed.  In a virtual 
conference, the sponsor sets a schedule of interactive webcast presentations by managers without any co-location, 
saving the costs of time and travel.  These presentations peaked at 63 in 2002 and have dropped to only 18 in 2007. 
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in investors’ private information, consensus in beliefs, and ability to interpret disclosures 
(Holthausen and Verrecchia [1990], Indjejikian [1991], Kim and Verrecchia [1994]).  A large 
number of participants with private information and greater ability to ask questions of managers 
and other participants should increase the “informedness” of the presentation (Holthausen and 
Verrecchia [1990]).   Participants can supplement their explicit information gathering with 
higher-order beliefs formed by observing the behavior of other participants.  Morris and Shin 
[2003] show a “publicity multiplier” effect in which “public briefings have a larger impact on the 
market than bilateral briefings with the same information because they automatically convey to 
participants not only information about market conditions, but also valuable information about 
the beliefs of the other participants.”  Co-location also allows participants to use nonverbal cues 
to assess the credibility of any information.  Research on nonverbal cues finds that a large 
percentage of information is communicated through body language, facial expressions, and vocal 
tone (Mehrabian [1972], Andersen [2008], Mayew and Venkatachalam [Forthcoming]).
6
  Thus, 
the information content of a conference presentation is a not only a function of explicit 
information releases, but also the degree to which the disclosure milieu facilitates information 
transfers, formation of higher-order beliefs, and the assessment of nonverbal cues.   
2.3 Predictions 
We develop predictions for which conference characteristics create a disclosure milieu 
that provides a larger potential for belief revision and, hence, greater information content to the 
presentation.  We also form predictions for which conference characteristics facilitate greater 
increases in following by analysts and institutional investors, who use the conference interactions 
to assess management’s credibility and commitment to transparency.  We illustrate the 
                                                 
6
 Some institutional investors actively evaluate nonverbal information by hiring ex-CIA or ex-FBI agents to watch 
management for signals of extreme stress or dishonesty (Rodier [2010]).   
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conference characteristics by referring to examples in Panel A of the Appendix, which provides a 
list of conferences taking place on October 3, 2007.   
2.3.1 Conference Sponsor 
The conference sponsor influences the disclosure milieu by inviting the firms and 
audience to the conference.  We divide sponsors into three categories: product market, top 
brokerage firm, and other capital market (see Panel B of the Appendix for details).  “Product 
market” conferences are sponsored by non-profit trade associations (e.g., Independent Petroleum 
Association of America), consulting firms (e.g., Sachs Associates) and media outlets (e.g., 
CFO.com), with the goal of facilitating management interactions with business partners.  
Investors and analysts can attend as well, but they do not necessarily receive direct access to 
managers.  Managers use these presentations to provide their view of the industry, and they often 
unveil new technologies, products, or business relationships.  Capital market conferences focus 
on meeting investor and analyst demands for access to management.  The presentations are 
designed to provide an overview of the firm’s operations and strategy and allow participants to 
fill-in their “mosaic” of information about the firm.  Within this group, “top brokerage firm” 
conferences (e.g., Bear Stearns) are organized by the analysts in the brokerage firm and attract a 
wide range of institutional investors with a large amount of private information, but generally 
exclude analysts from other brokerage firms.  In contrast, “other capital market” conferences are 
hosted by small brokerage firms (e.g., William Blair & Co.), stock exchanges (e.g., Borsa Italia), 
analyst societies (e.g., Consumer Analyst Group of New York), and investor relations firms.  
They tend to be smaller conferences focused on improving visibility for participating firms.   
We expect that presentations at product market conferences have greater information 
content than presentations at other capital market conferences due to managers’ incentives to 
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disclose new product information and to the ability of investors to assess the reactions of product 
market stakeholders.  We also expect that presentations at top brokerage conferences have 
greater information content than presentations at other capital market conferences due a greater 
number of sophisticated investors with private information.  Controlling for any information 
content of the presentation, we expect that product market conferences lead to smaller increases 
in analyst and institutional investor following because they are not designed to foster interaction 
among managers, analysts, and investors.  For top brokerage conferences, we predict that the 
combination of more large institutional investors and general exclusion of outside analysts leads 
to a greater (smaller) effect on institutional investor (analyst) following. 
2.3.2 Geographic Location  
The geographic location of the conference affects the disclosure milieu by influencing the 
size of the audience and the degree of interactions outside of the presentation.  We divide 
location into four groups: money centers, destinations, other US cities, and non-US cities (see 
Panel C of the Appendix).  “Money center” conferences are held in New York, Boston, San 
Francisco, and Chicago, where a substantial number of buy-side investors and analysts are based.  
The proximity to a large pool of capital market participants draws a larger audience, increasing 
both the informedness of the presentation and the number of potential new investors and 
analysts.  “Destination” conferences are held in locations such as Florida, Arizona, Southern 
California, and Las Vegas that require both investors and managers to travel long distances.  Due 
to the time commitment for travel and the desired location, participants are more likely to stay at 
the conference venue over a multi-day period, increasing the number of potential interactions 
between managers and investors.  Conferences held in “other US” cities tend to focus on either 
regional firms or a certain industry (e.g., Marcus Evans Defense Conference in Arlington, VA).  
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Finally, conferences held in “non-US cities” provide a venue to help firms overcome home bias 
and attract foreign investment (Bradshaw, Bushee and Miller [2004]).  However, such 
conferences are less likely to attract US investors and analysts.    
We expect that presentations at money center and destination conferences have greater 
information content and subsequent increases in analyst and institutional investor following than 
presentations at other US cities due to their larger audiences and greater opportunities for 
interactions, respectively.  We expect lower information content, and less impact on US analysts 
and investors, at non-US conferences as the goal is to increase visibility among foreign investors. 
2.3.3 Other Characteristics 
Conferences vary in the number of firms presenting, which influences the disclosure 
milieu by determining the size of the audience.  Large conferences provide a low-cost way for 
participants to view a large number of firms in a short time period and, thus, they attract more 
market participants.  Presentations at large conferences should produce larger stock market 
reactions if they allow a greater number of investors to have access to management, increasing 
the informedness of the presentation.  Larger conferences also provide more opportunity for 
information transfer across presentations due to the greater number of firms.  We expect 
conference size to be positively associated with both the information content of the presentation 
and the subsequent change in institutional investor and analyst following. 
The number of industries represented at the conference affects the disclosure milieu by 
influencing the potential amount of information transfer.  Some conferences are focused on one 
industry (e.g., Credit Suisse Aerospace and Defence Conference), while others are focused on an 
investment style (e.g., William Blair Micro-/ Small-Cap Growth Conference).  Industry 
conferences are more likely to attract a large number of analysts and investors with specialized 
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knowledge of that industry.  Thus, for any given firm, the percentage of the audience with 
potential interest in the firm is greater than at a broad conference.  This greater pool of interested 
attendees with industry-specific knowledge should produce a larger stock market reaction to the 
presentation due to the informedness effect and greater information transfers (Lang and 
Lundholm [1996b]).  Also, because analysts and investors specialize in sectors, presentations at 
industry-focused conferences should also be more effective at increasing analyst and institutional 
investor following.  We expect greater information content and larger increases in investor and 
analyst following for presentations at industry-focused conferences.   
While the number of recent conference presentations a company has given is not a 
characteristic of the disclosure milieu, we expect that more prior presentations will reduce the 
potential for new insights to investors’ private information.  However, multiple presentations 
indicate a commitment to transparency and allow managers to interact with more potential 
investors and analysts, increasing the likelihood that some decide to follow the firm.  We predict 
that more frequent presentations will be associated with less information content, but greater 
increases in analyst and investor following. 
One caveat to these predictions is that the disclosure milieu could also proxy for 
managers’ incentives to selectively disclose new material information.  While such actions 
would violate Reg FD, we cannot dismiss this possibility.  Thus, our predictions are conditional 
on the assumption that any potential selective disclosure is not correlated with these conference 
characteristics.  However, if the results were driven solely by selective disclosure, it would still 
imply that the disclosure milieu is important, but as a mechanism for eliciting private disclosure 
rather than as a mechanism for the audience to affect the information content of the conference.
7
  
                                                 
7
 Bushee, et al. [2011] use a sample of US capital market conferences with transcripts to identify situations in which 
investors have formal off-line access to managers in a one-on-one or breakout session.  They find an increase in 
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3. Sample and Variables 
3.1 Sample 
 
 We obtain data on conference presentations between 1999 and 2007 from the Thomson 
Reuters’ Street Events database.  For each presentation, Thomson provides the firm name, ticker, 
conference name, date, time, and location.
8
  Thomson collects this data from the conference 
sponsors and presenting companies to alert its clients of upcoming conferences and to provide 
webcasts.  Over 57% of the conferences are one-day events, 26% are two-day events, and 15% 
are three-to-five-day events.  After eliminating presentations by individuals unaffiliated with 
companies, panel discussions, annual meetings, analyst meetings that are misclassified as  
conference presentations (all in 1999), and presentations where the conference was cancelled 
(most were right after 9/11/2001), we have 120,991 conference presentations by 13,346 firms. 
 Next, we obtain stock return, trading volume, and industry data from the CRSP database.  
The requirement of CRSP data eliminates 15,886 presentations given by 6,085 firms, which 
include private firms, OTC Bulletin Board and Pink Sheets firms, and non-US firms.  Finally, we 
obtain institutional investor ownership data from the Thomson Reuters Form 13F database, 
analyst following data from the Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S database, and data on firm 
characteristics from the Compustat database.  After requiring this data, we have a final sample of 
95,105 presentations by 5,910 firms at 5,464 conferences sponsored by 849 organizations.   
                                                                                                                                                             
average trade sizes and potential trading gains during the hours when off-line access is provided.  While their results 
could indicate selective disclosure, it could also be consistent with investors using this access to update private 
information by asking for specific qualitative information or by assessing nonverbal cues.  In any case, they find that 
the conference characteristics examined in this paper do not proxy for formal offline access to managers. 
8
 The Thomson data is indexed by the current company ticker symbol, with acquired firms listed under the 
acquirer’s ticker.  In 1999 and since 2002, Thomson provides the company name at the time of the presentation, 
which allows us to identify the firm making the presentation.  When Thomson does not list the company name, we 
check Factiva for press releases to identify the firm presenting.  When we were unable to classify the presentation 
using Factiva, we classified it under the acquiring firm, which adds noise to some of the earlier data.   
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 Table 1 presents a breakdown of the sample by conference characteristics.  Panel A 
shows the sponsors and locations of the presentations by calendar year.  The number of 
conference presentations has grown over time, with a slight reversal in 2007.  This general 
upward trend is attributable to both an increase in the number of presentations and an increase in 
Thomson’s coverage of them.  The panel shows that about 11% of the presentations are at 
conferences focused on product markets, whereas the remaining 89% are roughly split between 
top brokerages and other capital market conferences.  Money centers are the most common 
location for conference presentations (65%), followed by destinations (22%), other US cities 
(8%), and non-US locations (6%). 
Panel B reports the number of industry-focused conferences and their distribution across 
sponsors and locations.  We define an industry-focused conference as having fewer than 4 
industries represented.
9
  About 28% of the conferences are industry-focused, suggesting that 
sponsors usually include a broad number of industries in conferences, likely to increase potential 
attendance by investors.  Almost 60% of product-market conferences are industry-focused, 
which is expected based on their goal of cultivating business relationships.  Industry-focused 
conferences comprise an above-average percent of those held in other US cities (35%) and 
outside the US (57%), and a below-average percent of destination conferences (18%).  Panel C 
presents a cross-tabulation of sponsors and locations.  Product market conferences are more 
likely to be held at destinations than capital market conferences, which tend to be held in money 
centers.  However, the table shows a large amount of variation across sponsors and locations. 
Panel D of Table 1 shows the Fama-French industry classification for our sample firms.  
Four industries account for 63% of our sample observations: Business Services, Health Care, 
                                                 
9
 We define industry using the 30-industry classification on Ken French’s website that was used in Brennan, Wang, 
and Xia [2004].  Our results are not sensitive to expanding the definition to be fewer than five or six industries. 
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Business Equipment, and Financial Services.  Because of this concentration on technology and 
financial services firms, all of our tests include industry fixed effects. 
3.2 Variable definitions 
We measure the effect of the disclosure milieu with indicator variables for product 
market conferences (DPRODMKT), top brokerage firm conferences (DCAPMKT_TOP), money 
center conferences (DMONCEN), destination conferences (DDEST), conferences held outside of 
the US (DNONUS), and industry-focused conferences (DINDUS_CONF).  Thus, the omitted 
group in the analyses is broad conferences hosted by other capital market sponsors in other US 
cities.  The size of the conference (LCONFSIZE) is the log of one plus the number of 
presentations.  We measure the frequency of prior conference presentations using the log of one 
plus the number of presentations given by the firm in the past 90 days (LPRIORPRES).   
To control for the possibility that the market reaction surrounding a conference 
presentation is driven by a concurrent material information disclosure, whether provided at the 
conference or not, we collect earnings announcement dates, management forecasts, and Form 8-
K filings (including Form 6-K filings for foreign registrants) for our sample firms.  We create an 
indicator variable (DINFO_EVENT) that equals one if any of these three events occur during the 
three-day conference presentation window and zero otherwise.
10
   
We also control for a large number of firm characteristics that prior literature finds are 
associated with voluntary disclosure activity.  For firm size, we include the log of market value 
of equity (LMV) 30 days before the presentation.  We measure institutional investor following as 
the percent holdings by institutions (PIH), defined as total shares owned by institutions divided 
                                                 
10
 This variable is not a perfect control for information released at a conference because a webcast of the 
presentation or open access with media coverage could satisfy the selective disclosure restrictions of Reg FD 
without a Form 8-K filing.  For example, even though product market conferences are often used to disclose new 
product information, only 17% have an associated Form 8-K filing. 
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by the total shares outstanding at the most recent calendar quarter end prior to the presentation.  
We measure analyst following as the log of one plus the number of analysts issuing earnings 
forecasts (LNANL) for any horizon during the calendar quarter prior to the presentation.  For both 
PIH and LNANL, we set the variable equal to zero for any period when the company is listed on 
an exchange but there is no data available.  We measure recent stock market activity with the 
buy-and-hold market-adjusted stock return (ANNMAR) and the average monthly share turnover 
(ANNTURN) for the year prior to 30 days before the presentation.  We also include an indicator 
variable for whether the company is headquartered outside the US (DFORFIRM). 
We include a number of proxies for profitability, growth, and potential undervaluation, 
including the earnings-price ratio (EP), dividend yield (DP), the book-to-price ratio (BP), the 
most recent change in net income (CNI), and the most recent annual sales growth (SGR).  As a 
visibility proxy, we add an indicator variable for whether the firm is listed on a Standard & 
Poor’s index (SPINDX).  We include the ratio of intangible assets to total assets (INTAN) to 
proxy for the complexity of a firm’s business.  We add a debt-to-assets leverage ratio (LEV), the 
standard deviation of stock returns (STD), and beta (BETA) to control for firm risk.  We proxy 
for firm age with the log of the number of years the firm has been listed (LTIME). 
 Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the conference characteristics and control 
variables.  The mean (median) conference size is 82 (61) presentations, indicating that 
conferences generally involve a large number of presentations.
11
  Conferences also tend to be 
somewhat diverse in terms of industry membership, with a mean (median) industry size of 9 (8) 
industries represented.  The median firm has presented at one other conference in the prior 90 
days.  The mean DINFO_EVENT is 0.174, indicating that only 17% of conference presentations 
                                                 
11
 There are 1,152 observations (1.2% of the sample) for which the conference size is only one presentation.  While 
many of these are company-sponsored conferences, some may be conferences for which Thomson has not collected 
all of the participating firms.  If we exclude these observations from the sample, the results are unchanged.  
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are accompanied by material information disclosures in the form of earnings announcements 
(1.0%), management forecasts (2.9%), and/or Form 8-K filings (15.0%) in the three-day window 
around the presentation.
12
  The sample firms tend to be large US firms with high institutional 
ownership (median = 67%), high analyst following (median = 9 analysts), and positive market-
adjusted returns in the prior year (median = 1.5%).  Conference presenters also tend to be growth 
firms with higher intangibles, lower leverage, lower return volatility, and higher beta.
13
     
 
4.  Market Reactions to Conference Presentations 
 We examine the market reaction to conference presentations using the three-day trading 
window (-1, +1) around the date of the presentation.  We use a three-day window because 43% 
of conferences are multiple-day events and one-third of the presentations occur outside of the 
Eastern US time zone.  Thus, information relevant to the firm could be priced on the day before 
or after the actual presentation.   
We measure the information content of the presentation with abnormal price variability 
and share turnover because we cannot measure the market’s expectations before the presentation 
or whether the presentation is good or bad news (Beaver [1968], Frankel, et al. [1999], 
Landsman and Maydew [2002], Cready and Hurtt [2002]).  We compute the abnormal absolute 
value of size-adjusted returns (ABS_SAR) as the difference between three-day absolute size-
adjusted returns and the mean three-day absolute size-adjusted returns in an estimation period, 
divided by the standard deviation of the mean absolute size-adjusted returns in the estimation 
period (Cready and Hurtt [2002]).  We measure abnormal share turnover (ABN_TURN) as three-
                                                 
12
 We also measured DINFO_EVENT using a five-day window; about 25% of presentations had an earnings 
announcement, forecast, or 8-K filing within this window.  All of our results were identical with this longer window.  
13
 We compared our sample to a sample of firms that did not present at conferences.  In both univariate comparisons 
and a logistic regression, all of the firm characteristics in Table 2 except EP and CNI were significantly different 
between the two samples. 
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day volume divided by shares outstanding, less the average three-day turnover in the estimation 
period.
14
  While correlated, the two measures differ based on the ex ante consensus among 
investors and ex post differences in interpretations (Kandel and Pearson [1995], Verrecchia 
[2001]).  Because we cannot measure ex ante or ex post beliefs in this setting, we use both 
measures to assess information content (Cready and Hurtt [2002]). 
 Table 3 reports mean and median market reactions around the presentation.  There is a 
significant spike in ABS_SAR and ABN_TURN during the presentation window, as well as 
significantly positive levels in the three days prior to the presentation.  The mean ABS_SAR 
(ABN_TURN) of 0.076 (0.148) during the conference window represents a 9% (5%) increase 
over the estimation period absolute returns (turnover).
15
  The small magnitude of these mean 
effects is not surprising given that managers generally do not disclose new information; rather, 
the information content stems from the private information of the audience.  The median 
ABS_SAR and ABN_TURN are negative because only 40-45% of the firms experience positive 
abnormal returns and turnover, suggesting that there is significant cross-sectional variation in the 
information content.  Moreover, the correlation between ABS_SAR and ABN_TURN in the three-
day window is 0.36, suggesting that some presentations produce price movements without high 
volume and vice versa.  These univariate results motivate our examination of the disclosure 
milieu to understand the cross-sectional differences in information content.
16
 
                                                 
14
 Prior work finds that ABS_SAR is more powerful than the Beaver [1968] U-statistic (which is based on squared 
returns) in detecting unsigned price responses (Cready and Mynatt [1991], Subramaniam [1997]).  Nevertheless, we 
find similar results using the Patell [1976] U-statistic and a standardized abnormal turnover measure. 
15
 While the standardized ABS_SAR measure has better econometric properties than unadjusted absolute size-
adjusted returns (ASAR) (e.g., it adjusts for the normal level of ASAR and exhibits less skewness), it is harder to 
interpret.  The mean ASAR during the conference window is 3.5%, compared to 3.2% during the estimation period 
with a standard deviation of 4.1%.  Multiplying ABS_SAR by 4.1% gives an approximation of the incremental ASAR.   
16
 We also looked at the signed size-adjusted returns (SAR) during the three-day window.  The mean (median) SAR 
is 0.50% (0.15%); both are significantly greater than zero.  Francis, et al. [1997] finds a similar magnitude of mean 
market-model abnormal returns in the three-days around analyst presentations (0.48%). The small positive SAR 
suggests that managers are on average disclosing good news, the market is correcting an undervaluation, and/or 
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 Table 4 presents regressions of ABS_SAR and ABN_TURN during the presentation 
window on the set of conference characteristics and the control variables.  We include year and 
industry fixed effects; thus, the coefficients on the conference characteristics reflect incremental 
effects beyond the positive industry-year effects of the omitted group (other capital market 
conferences in other US cities).  Significance tests are two-tailed and based on two-way clustered 
standard errors, with clustering at the firm and conference level and bootstrapping using the 
jackknife method (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller [2006], Petersen [2009]). 
Table 4 shows that the disclosure milieu significantly explains cross-sectional differences 
in abnormal absolute returns and share turnover, even after controlling for the significant effects 
of new information releases (DINFO_EVENT) and firm characteristics such as size, visibility, 
recent performance, and risk.  Product market (DPRODMKT) and top brokerage firm 
conferences (DCAPMKT_TOP) have significantly greater absolute returns and share turnover 
than other capital market conferences, suggesting that the size and nature of the audience affect 
the information content either through the pool of potential private information or, in the case of 
product conferences, incentives to release new information.  Conference location also 
significantly affects the market reaction, as presentations at money centers (DMONCEN) and 
destinations (DDEST) exhibit significantly larger information content than conferences in other 
US cities and outside the US (DNONUS).  This finding is consistent with the market response 
being impacted by both the composition of the audience and degree of interactions among 
audience and presenters.  There are also significantly greater market responses to presentations at 
larger conferences (LCONFSIZE), consistent with these conferences attracting a larger set of 
investors and increasing the informedness of the presentation.   Each significant coefficient 
                                                                                                                                                             
there is upward price pressure due to attracting more investors.  The only conference characteristics that 
significantly increase SAR are product market conferences and conference size.  The product market result is 
consistent with managers using this venue to provide new product announcements. 
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represents 5-10% greater abnormal absolute size-adjusted returns and share turnover than in the 
omitted group.  For example, a presentation at a product market conference in a money center 
would produce, on average, a 3.8% absolute SAR, compared to 3.2% for a presentation at a small 
brokerage firm conference in a regional US city (an increase of 19%).
17
 
Table 4 also shows a larger absolute return response to presentations at industry-focused 
conferences (DINDUS_CONF), consistent with greater information transfers among presenting 
firms.  There is a significantly lower absolute return response to presentations by firms that have 
recently presented in other conferences (LPRIORPRES), consistent with a reduction in the 
potential private information of investors due to the prior presentations.  In both cases, there is no 
significant effect on abnormal turnover.  This finding suggests that industry expertise and prior 
presentations create greater ex ante consensus among investors about the firm and a lesser degree 
of ex post differences in interpretations, resulting in any new information affecting price without 
a significantly higher amount of individual trades.  Overall, we find that conference sponsor, 
location, size, and industry-focus are significantly associated with the market reaction to 
conference presentations.  This evidence indicates that the disclosure milieu influences the 
degree to which participants are able to revise their beliefs about the firm.
18
   
 
5.  Changes in Investor and Analyst Following after Presentations 
We examine changes in institutional investor and analyst following after conference 
presentations over two horizons.  First, we report two-quarter changes in analyst following 
                                                 
17
 To put this magnitude in perspective, we computed absolute SAR for earnings announcements, forecasts, and 
Form 8-K filings during the same quarter as a presentation for our sample firms.  The average three-day absolute 
SAR is 6.4% for forecasts, 5.9% for earnings announcements, and 4.2% for Form 8-K filings.  
18
 The identity of the presenter (e.g., CEO, CFO) is a possible correlated omitted variable in this setting, but is only 
available for about 10% of the presentations that have archived transcripts.  We examined the transcript subsample 
to test whether CEO attendance affected the market reaction.  Before including a CEO indicator, we found that some 
conference characteristics were no longer significant at conventional levels due to the small sample size.  However, 
adding a CEO indicator variable did not affect the signs or significance of any of the conference characteristics.  
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(CNANL2) and institutional investor ownership (CPIH2).  CNANL2 is the difference between the 
number of unique analysts issuing forecasts in the first full calendar quarter after the presentation 
and the number in the calendar quarter prior to the presentation.
19
  CPIH2 is the difference 
between institutional ownership at the end of the calendar quarter subsequent to the presentation 
and the end of the quarter prior to the presentation.  We do not examine the calendar quarter of 
the presentation because the presentation could have taken place too late in the quarter for 
investors and analysts to react.  Second, we report four-quarter changes in analyst following 
(CNANL4) and institutional investor ownership (CPIH4) as the difference between analyst 
following and institutional ownership three full quarters after the presentation and the quarter 
prior to the presentation (i.e., the same calendar quarters one year apart).  The advantage of the 
two-quarter change is that it more closely ties the change in analyst and investor following to the 
presentation.  The disadvantage of the two-quarter change is that there is seasonality in analyst 
forecasting behavior (e.g., more forecasts are generally issued prior to the annual earnings) and 
an increase in following may not be detected in a short window.   
Table 5 provides univariate evidence showing that firms presenting at conferences 
experience significant increases in both analyst following and institutional ownership, on 
average, subsequent to the presentations.  The mean CNANL2 (CNANL4) is 0.201 (0.326) and 
the median changes are zero.  These changes reflect that fact that only 40-45% of firms 
experience increases in analyst coverage after a presentation, and those that do tend to have an 
increase of one analyst.  The magnitude of the mean increase in CNANL4 is comparable to prior 
work, which typically finds a mean change in analyst following of less than one analyst after an 
                                                 
19
 We estimated all of our results using both logged and unlogged changes in analyst following.  There is some 
skewness in the level of analyst following, so we use the log of analyst following as a control variable in the tables.  
However, because the skewness is less pronounced in unlogged changes in analyst following and the logged changes 
are more difficult to interpret, we report the unlogged changes in the tables.  The signs and significance of all of the 
main results are the same for logged and unlogged changes in analyst following. 
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event (e.g., Healy, et al. [1999], Irani and Karamanou [2003]).  Francis, et al. [1997] reports a 
mean annual increase of 0.77 in analyst coverage after presentations at conferences solely 
focused on analysts.  Given that many conferences are not geared toward attracting analysts (e.g., 
product market), and many exclude outside analysts (e.g., top brokerage), increases in analyst 
coverage should not be broadly realized in our sample.   
Table 5 shows a mean (median) CPIH2 of 0.017 (0.01) and a mean (median) CPIH4 of 
0.028 (0.02), with around 60% of firms experiencing increases in institutional investor 
ownership.  These changes are also comparable to prior work, e.g., Bushee and Noe [2000] find 
an increase of 0.011 in percent transient institutional ownership for firms increasing disclosure 
quality and Covrig, DeFond and Hung [2007] find firms that adopt International Accounting 
Standards have 0.009 higher percentage of foreign institutional ownership.   
Table 6 presents results of regressions of two- and four-quarter changes in institutional 
ownership and analyst following on the set of conference characteristics and control variables.  
In addition, we control for the information content of the presentation using the variables in 
Table 3 (ABS_SAR and ABN_TURN), as well as signed size-adjusted returns (SAR) to capture 
any potential effects due to the direction of the return reaction to the presentation.  We include 
year and industry fixed effects; thus, the coefficients on the conference characteristics reflect 
incremental effects beyond the positive industry-year effects of the omitted group (other capital 
market conferences in other US cities).  Significance tests are two-tailed and based on two-way 
clustered standard errors, with clustering at the firm and conference level and bootstrapping 
using the jackknife method (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller [2006], Petersen [2009]). 
Table 6 shows that most of the control variables significantly explain changes in analyst 
and institutional investor following.  Notably, the measures of the three-day market reaction to 
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the presentation—ABS_SAR, ABN_TURN, and SAR—all significantly explain future changes in 
analyst and investor following.  Thus, the results for the conference characteristics can be 
interpreted as measuring the effect of the audience and its interactions incremental to the 
information content of the presentation, i.e. the effect of the milieu on participants’ ability to 
assess the competence and credibility of managers, as well as their commitment to transparency. 
The first two columns of Table 6 show that changes in analyst following are negatively 
associated with presentations at product market conferences and top brokerage conferences, 
consistent with analysts not being the target audience in either of these settings.  These negative 
relations still reflect increases in analyst following, but they are 7-12% smaller increases than 
mean CNANL4 of 0.983 for the omitted group of other capital market conferences (which include 
analyst societies).  Analysts are also significantly less likely to increase coverage of firms 
presenting at non-US conferences, consistent with US analysts not being the target of those 
presentations.  There is no significant relation between conference size and analyst following, 
suggesting either that the pool of potential new analysts does not increase with the number of 
firms presenting or that larger conferences are larger due to more small firms, for which analysts 
are less likely to initiate coverage.  Changes in analyst following are significantly positively 
related to presentations at industry-focused conferences, but only using the seasonally-adjusted 
CNANL4, consistent with the industry-based structure of analyst coverage.  Finally, increases in 
analyst following are significantly larger for firms that have presented at multiple recent 
conferences, consistent with analysts initiating coverage of firms that have become more visible 
and, hence, provide a bigger potential demand for analyst research and brokerage services. 
Similar to analysts, the change in institutional ownership is positively associated with the 
number of recent conference presentations, suggesting that frequent presentations reach a greater 
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potential audience of new investors, and negatively associated with non-US conferences.  Also 
similar to analysts, and contrary to our predictions, there is no relation between destination or 
money center conferences and institutional ownership, indicating that the increases in following 
for these conferences are similar to the omitted group (other capital market conferences in other 
US cities).  In contrast, changes in institutional ownership are positively related to presentations 
at large conferences and top brokerage firm conferences, with the latter resulting in 0.5% higher 
CPIH4 than other capital market conferences.  These results suggest that institutional investors 
are more likely to attend conferences that provide them with preferential access to a large 
number of firms, thus reducing the costs of learning about these firms. 
Overall, the disclosure milieu has a significant effect on changes in analyst and investor 
following incremental to the information content of the presentations.  Notably, top brokerage 
and larger conferences attract greater institutional ownership, but not greater analyst following, 
consistent with these conferences providing a larger pool of potential investors, but not 
necessarily a larger pool of potential new analysts.  These findings indicate that the milieu 
captures audience effects per se, rather than a general relation between conferences and visibility 
that affect all market participants in the same manner.
20
 
 
6. Conclusion 
We examine a large sample of conference presentations to investigate how the setting in 
which a disclosure takes place—the “disclosure milieu”—affects the market reaction to 
                                                 
20
 Our results could be subject to an endogeneity bias due to managers choosing to present at certain conferences; 
however, we believe selection issues are likely to be limited in our sample.  First, firms tend not to always select the 
same bundle of conference characteristics (e.g., the average firm presenting at four conferences in a year experiences 
two different types of sponsors and locations).  Second, we estimated a Heckman two-stage model based on the 
decision to present at any conference in a given year (using the variables in Table 2) and found that none of our 
main results in Table 4 and 6 lose statistical significance when we include the inverse Mills ratio. 
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disclosure.  There are significant mean abnormal stock return and volume reactions to 
presentations, driven by the 40-45% of the firms experiencing a positive abnormal market 
response.  However, there is a great deal of cross-sectional variation as indicated by the negative 
median reactions.  We find that conference characteristics such as sponsor, location, size, and 
industry-focus are significantly associated with the market response, consistent with the 
disclosure milieu explaining the cross-sectional variation in the information content of the 
presentation.  We also find that conference characteristics are associated with changes in analyst 
following and institutional investor ownership.  Analysts increase their following in firms with 
frequent recent presentations at industry-focused and capital market conferences, consistent with 
analysts seeking firms that are building visibility through conference activity.  In contrast, large 
conferences hosted by the top brokerage firms are associated with increases in institutional 
ownership, consistent with these conferences attracting a larger pool of prospective investors for 
the firm. 
These findings contribute to the voluntary disclosure literature by documenting how the 
“disclosure milieu,” or physical and social space in which a disclosure occurs, influences the 
market response to disclosure by affecting the nature of the audience and its interactions.  While 
the conference setting allows researchers to empirically measure the characteristics of the milieu, 
the disclosure milieu likely affects managers and investors in other disclosure settings that 
involve a defined physical place, a specific time, and/or a limited audience (e.g., road shows or 
annual shareholder meetings).  For example, critics have objected to proposals for “virtual” 
annual meetings based on concerns about not being able to observe other audience members and 
losing the interaction with managers.  Our findings suggest that, despite advances in technology, 
virtual meetings are unlikely to serve as a sufficient substitute for face-to-face meetings due to 
 26 
the economically significant effect of the disclosure milieu on investors’ information gathering 
and belief revision.   Thus, future research examining the disclosure milieu could provide new 
insights into not only the market response to voluntary disclosure, but also the choice of 
voluntary disclosure venues.
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APPENDIX 
Conference Examples and Classifications by Sponsor and by Location 
 
Panel A: Conferences taking place on October 3, 2007 
 
Conference Name Dates Location 
Banc of America Securities Debt Capital Markets Seminar  Oct 3-4   New York, NY   
Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc. Lisbon CDO Conference  Oct 3   Lisbon, PRT   
BioContact Biopharmaceutical Partnership Symposium  Oct 3-5   Quebec, CAN 
BioProcess International™ Conference & Exhibition  Oct 1-4   Boston, MA   
Borsa Italia Star Conference  Oct 3-4   London, GB   
Consumer Analyst Group of New York Monthly Meeting  Oct 3   New York, NY   
CEATEC JAPAN 2007  Oct 1-5   Chiba, JAP   
CFO.com Rising West Conference  Sep 30-Oct 3 Las Vegas, NV   
CIBC World Markets 2nd Annual Industrials Conference  Oct 2-3   New York, NY   
Credit Suisse Aerospace and Defence Conference  Oct 3   London, GB   
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. Leveraged Finance Conference  Oct 2-4   Scottsdale, AZ   
Deutsche Bank Strategy & Solutions Derivatives Conference  Oct 3-5   Hong Kong, CHN 
EEI Occupational Safety and Health Committee Conference  Sep 30-Oct 3 Tucson, AZ   
EEI Fall National Accounts Workshop  Sep 30-Oct 3 Indianapolis, IN   
Gabelli & Company, Inc. 3rd Annual RFID Conference  Oct 3   Chicago, IL   
Global CDO and Credit Opportunity Fund Conference  Oct 2-5   Phoenix, AZ   
IBC BioProcess Conference  Oct 1-4   Boston, MA   
IEEE 2007 International Telecommunications Energy Conference  Sep 30-Oct 4 Rome, ITA 
Independent Petroleum Assoc. of America’s 2007 OGIS West  Oct 1-3   San Francisco, CA  
IQPC Hedge Fund Operations and Compliance Conference  Oct 1-3   Stamford, CT   
Leerink Swann & Company: Aesthetics Roundtable Conference  Oct 3   New York, NY   
Marcus Evans Lean and Six Sigma for Defense Conference  Oct 3-5   Arlington, VA   
Opal Financial Group Private Equity Summit Oct 1-3   Las Vegas, NV   
RailTrends 2007 Conference  Oct 3-4   New York, NY   
Reed Exhibitions' 10th Design Engineering & Mfg Solutions Expo  Oct 2-4   Osaka, JAP   
Sachs Associates Biotech in Europe Investor Forum  Oct 2-3   Zurich, CH   
Sibos 2007 Boston  Oct 1-5   Boston, MA   
Society for Information Display Mobile Displays 2007  Oct 2-3   San Diego, CA   
Strategic Research Inst.  4th Annual Energy Tech Conference  Oct 3-4   San Jose, CA   
The 2007 Private Equity Energy Forum  Oct 2-3   New York, NY   
UBS Climate Change - Impact and Opportunities Conference  Oct 3   London, GB   
Webcom Software Business 2007 Conference  Oct 2-3   Santa Clara, CA   
William Blair & Company Micro-/ Small-Cap Growth Conference  Oct 3   New York, NY   
Windhover Information In3 East Conference  Oct 3-5   Boston, MA   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A presents the list of conferences taking place on October 3, 2007 according to Thomson Financial Street 
Events.  
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APPENDIX (Continued) 
Conference Examples and Classifications by Sponsor and by Location 
 
Panel B: Classification of Conference Sponsors 
 
 
Number of 
Organizations 
Number of 
Conferences 
Number of 
Presentations 
Product Market Sponsors       
  Trade Association 269   (31.7%) 662 (12.1%) 7,056 (7.4%) 
  Consulting Firm 198 (23.3%) 514 (9.4%) 2,029 (2.1%) 
  Media Organization 68 (8.0%) 243 (4.4%) 1,044 (1.1%) 
  Individual Company 57 (6.7%) 71 (1.3%) 166 (0.2%) 
  University 6 (0.7%) 9 (0.2%) 61 (0.1%) 
Capital Market Sponsors       
  Top Brokerage Firm 14 (1.6%) 1,943 (35.6%) 43,867 (46.1%) 
  Other Brokerage Firm 191 (22.5%) 1,614 (29.5%) 37,091 (39.0%) 
  Analyst Society 13 (1.5%) 159 (2.9%) 1,777 (1.9%) 
  Investor Relations Firm 25 (2.9%) 183 (3.3%) 1,435 (1.5%) 
  Stock Exchange 8 (0.9%) 66 (1.2%) 579 (0.6%) 
Total 849  5,464  95,105  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B shows the breakdown of conference sponsors by the number of unique organizations in the category, the 
number of conferences hosted by the category, and the numbers of presentations at such conferences, which is the 
sample used in the empirical tests.  For each conference, we first identify the sponsoring organization from the title 
of the conference or from Internet searches.  Next, we classify the sponsor into one of ten categories based on our 
prior knowledge of the sponsor and on Internet searches for information about the sponsors.  Trade associations 
include research associations (e.g., American Academy of Allergy, Asthma and Immunology) and industry 
associations (e.g., American Bankers Association).  Consulting firms include general management consulting firms 
(e.g., Accenture), industry-specific consulting firms (e.g., Cambridge Energy Research Associates), and 
organizations that specialize in trade fairs (e.g., Reed Exhibitions).  Media organizations include general media 
outlets (e.g. Economist) and industry-focused publications (e.g., Chemical Week).  Individual companies include 
any company whose business is not consulting or media that hosts a conference (e.g., Ford Motor Company 
Convergence Conference).  Finally, a small number of universities host conferences.  Brokerage firms include firms 
that provide brokerage and/or investment research services.  Due to the wide range of size and prestige within this 
group, we subdivided it into “top” brokerage firms and other brokerage firms based on the number of conferences 
hosted per year in our sample.  There are 14 “top” brokerage firms that have hosted more than 12 conferences per 
year (or one per month), on average, while all other brokerages have hosted fewer than nine per year.  Analyst 
societies include the New York Society of Security Analysts and other regional analyst groups.  Investor Relations 
firms are firms whose main business is to target investors for their clients’ stock, and stock exchanges include the 
NYSE, Borsa Italia, and other exchanges.   
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APPENDIX (Continued) 
Conference Examples and Classifications by Sponsor and by Location 
 
Panel C: Classification of Conference Locations 
 
 
Number of 
Conferences 
Number of 
Presentations 
Money Centers     
  New York City 2,012 (36.8%) 42,436 (44.6%) 
  San Francisco 385 (7.0%) 9,786 (10.3%) 
  Boston 337 (6.2%) 6,229 (6.5%) 
  Chicago 132 (2.4%) 2,936 (3.1%) 
Destinations     
  Florida 255 (4.7%) 6,397 (6.7%) 
  California 266 (4.9%) 6,047 (6.4%) 
  Arizona 101 (1.8%) 3,000 (3.2%) 
  Nevada 167 (3.1%) 2,960 (3.1%) 
  Other 79 (1.4%) 2,004 (2.1%) 
Other US     
  Maryland & DC 97 (1.8%) 1,504 (1.6%) 
  Georgia 52 (1.0%) 1,160 (1.2%) 
  Texas 108 (2.0%) 900 (0.9%) 
  Other 488 (8.9%) 4,217 (4.4%) 
Non-US     
  United Kingdom 336 (6.1%) 2,133 (2.2%) 
  Other Europe 234 (4.3%) 1,671 (1.8%) 
  Canada 236 (4.3%) 1,178 (1.2%) 
  Asia 157 (2.9%) 505 (0.5%) 
  Other 22 (0.4%) 42 (0.0%) 
Total 5,464  95,105  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel C shows the breakdown of the conference location by the number of conferences hosted and by the numbers 
of presentations at such conferences in our sample.  We collected the location of the conference from the Thomson 
Street Events database.  Money Center conferences are those held in the New York City, San Francisco, Boston, and 
Chicago metro areas.  We classify Destination conferences as those held in locations that would generally be 
considered vacation destinations, including Florida, Southern California, Arizona, Nevada, any other obvious resort 
destinations (e.g., Jackson Hole, Myrtle Beach, Caribbean islands).  The authors independently attempted to classify 
locations as destinations, and the overlap among our ratings was over 90%.  All other conferences held in the US are 
classified as “Other US.”  Finally, all conferences held outside of the US, other than those in Caribbean islands, 
were classified as “non-US”.  We note that two difficult cities to classify were Los Angeles and New Orleans.  As 
the second-largest city, Los Angeles could be considered a money center.  However, very few conferences in the 
Los Angeles metro area are held in Los Angeles itself.  Almost all are held in Orange County ocean-side 
communities or in Anaheim.  We classified New Orleans in the “other US” city category, rather than a destination 
location, because the majority of the New Orleans conferences were hosted by local brokerages or focused on local 
industries (e.g., Oil and Gas).  We estimated our results with Los Angeles classified as a money center and New 
Orleans classified as a destination, and the results were similar. 
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TABLE 1 
Sample Composition 
 
Panel A: Conference Sponsor and Location by Year 
 
 Sponsor  Location   
  Capital Market  US    
Year 
Product 
Market 
Top 
Brokerages Other  
Money 
Centers Destinations Other US Non-US  Total 
1999 33  798  1,219   1,147  448  434  21   2,050  
2000 307  689  2,447   2,172  732  466  73   3,443  
2001 429  2,645  3,111   4,270  908  698  309   6,185  
2002 681  5,393  3,433   6,145  2,083  737  542   9,507  
2003 1,137  5,221  4,128   7,021  2,181  858  426   10,486  
2004 1,551  6,268  4,980   8,016  3,211  905  667   12,799  
2005 2,034  7,517  6,838   10,379  3,681  1,308  1,021   16,389  
2006 2,015  8,408  7,800   11,305  4,235  1,295  1,388   18,223  
2007 2,169  6,928  6,926   10,932  2,929  1,080  1,082   16,023  
Total 10,356  43,867  40,882   61,387  20,408  7,781  5,529   95,105  
  10.9% 46.1% 43.0%  64.5% 21.5% 8.2% 5.8%    
 
 
Panel B: Conference Sponsor and Location by Industry Focus 
 
  Capital Market  US    
Conference Focus 
Product 
Market 
Top 
Brokerages Other  
Money 
Centers Destinations Other US Non-US  Total 
Industry-focused 6,049  11,037  9,478   17,010  3,702  2,722  3,130   26,564  
Broad 4,307  32,830  31,404   44,377  16,706  5,059  2,399   68,541  
Total 10,356  43,867  40,882   61,387  20,408  7,781  5,529   95,105  
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TABLE 1 (Continued) 
Sample Composition 
 
Panel C: Cross-Tabulation of Location and Sponsor 
 
 Sponsor 
  Capital Market 
Location 
Product 
Market 
Top 
Brokerages Other 
Destinations 3,442  10,696  6,270  
Money Centers 4,366  28,737  28,284  
Other US 1,471  1,894  4,416  
Non-US 1,077  2,540  1,912  
Total 10,356  43,867  40,882  
 
Panel D: Fama-French Industries of Conference Presenters 
 
Industry Frequency Percent 
Personal and Business Services 16,110  16.9  
Healthcare, Medical Equipment, Pharmaceutical Products 16,062  16.9  
Business Equipment 15,302  16.1  
Banking, Insurance, Real Estate, Trading 12,077  12.7  
Petroleum and Natural Gas 4,152  4.4  
Communication 3,753  4.0  
Retail 3,168  3.3  
Fabricated Products and Machinery 2,639  2.8  
Wholesale 2,567  2.7  
Utilities 2,144  2.3  
Transportation 1,800  1.9  
Construction and Construction Materials 1,666  1.8  
Electrical Equipment 1,590  1.7  
Recreation 1,456  1.5  
Chemicals 1,447  1.5  
Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 1,343  1.4  
All Other Industries Less than 1% of the sample 7,829  8.3  
Total 95,105  100  
 
Table 1 provides a breakdown of conference presentations by sponsor, location, year, type, and Fama-French 
industries. “Product Market” conferences focus on communications with business partners and “Capital Market” 
conferences involve interactions with investors and analysts.  Within Capital Market conferences, those sponsored 
by brokerage firms hosting more than 12 conferences per year are categorized as “Top Brokerages” and the others 
are under “Other”, which includes all other brokerage firms, analyst societies, investor relations firms, and stock 
exchanges.  Conferences located in “Money Centers” are those held in New York City, San Francisco, Boston, and 
Chicago metro areas.  “Destination” conferences are held in Florida, Southern California, Arizona, Nevada and other 
resort destinations.  Conferences held in other U.S. locations are categorized as “Other US” and those held outside 
of the U.S. are categorized as “Non-US” (see Appendix for more details). Panel A shows the sponsors and locations 
of the presentations by calendar year.  Panel B presents the number of industry-focused conferences and their 
distribution across sponsors and locations.  We define an industry-focused conference as having fewer than four 
Fama-French 30 industries (from Kenneth French’s website) represented at the conference. Panel C presents a cross-
tabulation of conferences by location and sponsor. Panel D presents a breakdown by Fama-French industries. 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics of Conference and Firm Characteristics 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min P25 Median P75 Max 
DPRODMKT 0.109 0.312 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
DCAPMKT_TOP 0.461 0.498 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
DMONCEN 0.645 0.478 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
DDEST 0.215 0.411 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
DNONUS 0.058 0.234 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
NINDUS 8.662 5.872 1.000 4.000 8.000 12.000 26.000 
DINDUS_CONF 0.279 0.449 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
CONFSIZE 82.118 71.735 1.000 27.000 61.000 119.000 377.000 
LCONFSIZE 3.934 1.131 0.000 3.296 4.111 4.779 5.932 
PRIORPRES 1.466 1.618 0.000 0.000 1.000 2.000 16.000 
LPRIORPRES 0.713 0.610 0.000 0.000 0.693 1.099 2.833 
        
DINFO_EVENT 0.174 0.379 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
MV 7,942.889 24,465.530 2.456 431.550 1,336.940 4,782.233 498,203.100 
LMV 7.330 1.769 0.898 6.067 7.198 8.473 13.119 
PIH 0.619 0.272 0.000 0.436 0.670 0.836 1.000 
NANL 10.831 8.073 0.000 5.000 9.000 15.000 51.000 
LNANL 2.204 0.797 0.000 1.792 2.303 2.773 3.951 
ANNMAR 0.111 0.545 -1.000 -0.226 0.015 0.306 2.000 
ANNTURN 0.212 0.175 0.000 0.092 0.159 0.274 0.860 
DFORFIRM 0.089 0.285 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
EP 0.006 0.086 -0.217 -0.015 0.031 0.056 0.166 
DP 0.007 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.090 
BP 0.415 0.292 -0.210 0.215 0.362 0.559 1.500 
CNI 0.020 0.133 -0.400 -0.012 0.008 0.031 0.820 
SGR 0.284 0.676 -0.600 0.025 0.138 0.325 4.800 
SPINDX 0.486 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
INTAN 0.150 0.186 0.000 0.003 0.065 0.239 0.777 
LEV 0.209 0.213 0.000 0.012 0.161 0.329 0.950 
STD 0.031 0.017 0.000 0.019 0.027 0.039 0.080 
BETA 1.114 0.600 -0.626 0.682 1.060 1.503 2.874 
TIME 15.088 15.543 0.167 5.175 9.758 18.754 81.999 
LTIME 2.406 0.862 0.154 1.820 2.376 2.983 4.419 
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TABLE 2 (Continued) 
Descriptive Statistics of Conference and Firm Characteristics 
 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the conference and firm characteristics.  The number of observations for 
each of the variables is 95,105.  DPRODMKT equals 1 if the presentation was at a product market-focused 
conference, 0 otherwise.  DCAPMKT_TOP equals 1 if the presentation was at a top brokerage firm, 0 otherwise.  
DMONCEN equals 1 if the presentation was at a money center location, 0 otherwise.  DDEST equals 1 if the 
presentation was at a destination location, 0 otherwise.  DNONUS equals 1 if the presentation was held outside of 
the U.S., 0 otherwise.  NINDUS is measured as the number of Fama-French industries (30 categories) represented at 
the conference.  DINDUS_CONF equals 1 if the presentation was at an industry-focused conference, 0 otherwise.  
We define an industry-focused conference as having fewer than four industries represented at the conference.   
CONFSIZE is measured as the number of presentations that occur at the conference.  LCONFSIZE is the log of one 
plus CONFSIZE.  PRIORPRES is the number of conference presentations given by the firm in the past ninety days.  
LPRIORPRES is the log of one plus PRIORPRES.  DINFO_EVENT equals 1 if an earnings announcement, 
management forecast, and/or Form 8-K filing (including Form 6-K filings for foreign registrants) occurred within 
the three-day window surrounding the presentation, 0 otherwise.  MV is market value in millions (from CRSP) 
measured 30 days before the conference presentation.  LMV is the log of MV.  PIH is the percentage ownership by 
institutional investors, defined as total shares owned by institutions divided by the total shares outstanding, for the 
most recent calendar quarter end prior to the conference presentation.  NANL is the number of unique analysts 
issuing an earnings forecast for any horizon during the calendar quarter prior to the conference presentation.  
LNANL is the log of one plus NANL.  For both PIH and LNANL, we assume the variable has a value of zero for any 
period when the company is listed on an exchange but there is no data available.  ANNMAR is the buy-and-hold 
market-adjusted stock return over the year prior to 30 days before the presentation.  ANNTURN is the average 
monthly share turnover, computed as volume divided by shares outstanding, for the year prior to 30 days before the 
presentation.  DFORFIRM is an indicator variable set to 1 if the company is headquartered outside the U.S., 0 
otherwise.  EP is the earnings-to-price ratio at fiscal year-end (FYE) prior to presentation.  DP is the dividend-to-
price ratio at FYE prior to presentation.  BP is the book-to-price ratio at FYE prior to presentation.  CNI is the 
change in net income, deflated by market value at FYE prior to presentation.  SGR is the sales growth at FYE prior 
to presentation.  SPINDX is the indicator for listing on any S&P index at FYE prior to presentation.  INTAN is the 
intangible assets/total assets at FYE prior to presentation.  LEV is the leverage at FYE prior to presentation.  STD is 
the standard deviation of stock returns (from CRSP) for year prior to presentation.  BETA is the beta (from CRSP) of 
the stock for year prior to presentation.  TIME is the number of years the company has been listed.  LTIME is the log 
of TIME. 
  
TABLE 3 
Mean and Median Stock Market Reactions during Windows around the Presentation Date 
 
 Variable Window Mean Median Pct. > 0 N 
ABS_SAR (-7, -5) 0.015
***
 -0.272
***
 38.0% 95,103 
 (-4, -2) 0.036
***
 -0.261
***
 38.7% 95,104 
 (-1, +1) 0.076
***
 -0.228
***
 40.4% 95,105 
 (-2, +4) -0.015
***
 -0.279
***
 37.5% 95,103 
 (-5, +7) -0.016
***
 -0.287
***
 37.2% 95,103 
      
ABN_TURN (-7, -5) -0.040
***
 -0.185
***
 40.0% 95,103 
 (-4, -2) 0.030
***
 -0.158
***
 41.4% 95,104 
 (-1, +1) 0.148
***
 -0.095
***
 44.6% 95,105 
 (-2, +4) -0.031
***
 -0.160
***
 41.1% 95,103 
 (-5, +7) -0.056
***
 -0.175
***
 40.6% 95,103 
 
*, **, *** Significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, using a two-tailed test 
(means) and a Wilcoxon signed rank test (medians). 
 
Table 3 provides means and medians of stock market reaction variables during various three-day windows before 
and after firms’ conference presentations.  Day 0 is the day on which each firm makes its presentation.  The absolute 
value of size-adjusted returns (ABS_SAR) is defined as the absolute value of three-day size-adjusted returns less the 
mean absolute value of three-day size-adjusted returns during estimation period, divided by the standard deviation of 
the absolute values during the estimation period. Abnormal share turnover (ABN_TURN) is defined as the three-day 
volume divided by shares outstanding, less the average three-day turnover in the estimation period, times 100.  The 
estimation period begins 120 days prior to the presentation and ends 30 days prior to the presentation. 
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TABLE 4 
Regressions of Stock Market Reactions during the Three-Day Window  
around the Presentation Date on Conference Characteristics and Control Variables 
 
Variable ABN_SAR  ABN_TURN 
DPRODMKT 0.070
**
  0.127
**
 
DCAPMKT_TOP 0.034
**
  0.091
**
 
DDEST 0.053
**
  0.186
***
 
DMONCEN 0.073
***
  0.156
***
 
DNONUS 0.016  -0.001 
LCONFSIZE 0.020
**
  0.037
**
 
DINDUS_CONF 0.044
**
  0.064 
LPRIORPRES -0.016
*
  0.031 
  
 
 
 DINFO_EVENT 0.280
***
  0.733
***
 
LMV -0.019
***
  -0.001 
PIH 0.032  0.499
***
 
LNANL -0.018
**
  0.017 
ANNMAR -0.020
**
  0.241
***
 
ANNTURN -0.141
***
  -2.136
***
 
DFORFIRM 0.015  0.070
*
 
EP -0.061  0.230 
DP -0.986
**
  -3.182
***
 
BP -0.008  -0.009 
CNI 0.025  -0.003 
SGR 0.017
**
  0.033 
SPINDX 0.003  -0.062
**
 
INTAN -0.020  -0.038 
LEV 0.014  0.108
*
 
STD -1.370
**
  2.484
*
 
BETA 0.017
*
  0.111
***
 
LTIME -0.003  -0.056
***
 
YEAR EFFECTS Included  Included 
INDUSTRY EFFECTS Included  Included 
N 95,105  95,105 
Adjusted R
2
 0.011  0.036 
 
*, **, *** Significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, using a two-tailed test 
based on two-way clustered standard errors, with clustering at the firm and conference level and bootstrapping using 
the jackknife method  
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TABLE 4 (Continued) 
Regressions of Stock Market Reactions during the Three-Day Window  
around the Presentation Date on Conference Characteristics and Control Variables 
 
Table 4 presents regressions of ABS_SAR and ABN_TURN during the presentation window (-1, +1) on the set of 
conference characteristics and control variables.   The absolute value of size-adjusted returns (ABS_SAR) is defined 
as the absolute value of three-day size-adjusted returns less the mean absolute value of three-day size-adjusted 
returns during estimation period, divided by the standard deviation of the absolute values during the estimation 
period. Abnormal share turnover (ABN_TURN) is defined as the three-day volume divided by shares outstanding, 
less the average three-day turnover in the estimation period, times 100.  The estimation period begins 120 days prior 
to the presentation and ends 30 days prior to the presentation. DPRODMKT equals 1 if the presentation was at a 
product market-focused conference, 0 otherwise.  DCAPMKT_TOP equals 1 if the presentation was at a top 
brokerage firm, 0 otherwise.  DDEST equals 1 if the presentation was at a destination location, 0 otherwise.  
DNONUS equals 1 if the presentation was held outside of the U.S., 0 otherwise.  DMONCEN equals 1 if the 
presentation was at a money center location, 0 otherwise.  LCONFSIZE is the log of one plus the number of 
presentations that occur at the conference.  DINDUS_CONF equals 1 if the presentation was at an industry-focused 
conference, 0 otherwise.  We define an industry-focused conference as having fewer than four industries represented 
at the conference.  LPRIORPRES is the log of one the number of conference presentations given by the firm in the 
past ninety days.  DINFO_EVENT equals 1 if an earnings announcement, management forecast, and/or Form 8-K 
filing occurred (including Form 6-K filings for foreign registrants) within the three-day window surrounding the 
presentation, 0 otherwise.  LMV is the log of the market value in millions (from CRSP) measured 30 days before the 
conference presentation.  PIH is the percentage ownership by institutional investors, defined as total shares owned 
by institutions divided by the total shares outstanding, for the most recent calendar quarter end prior to the 
conference presentation.  LNANL is the log of one plus the number of unique analysts issuing an earnings forecast 
for any horizon during the calendar quarter prior to the conference presentation.  For both PIH and LNANL, we 
assume the variable has a value of zero for any period when the company is listed on an exchange but there is no 
data available.  ANNMAR is the buy-and-hold market-adjusted stock return over the year prior to 30 days before the 
presentation.  ANNTURN is the average monthly share turnover, computed as volume divided by shares outstanding, 
for the year prior to 30 days before the presentation.  DFORFIRM is an indicator variable set to 1 if the company is 
headquartered outside the U.S., 0 otherwise.  EP is the earnings-to-price ratio at fiscal year-end (FYE) prior to 
presentation.  DP is the dividend-to-price ratio at FYE prior to presentation.  BP is the book-to-price ratio at FYE 
prior to presentation.  CNI is the change in net income, deflated by market value at FYE prior to presentation.  SGR 
is the sales growth at FYE prior to presentation.  SPINDX is the indicator for listing on any S&P index at FYE prior 
to presentation.  INTAN is the intangible assets/total assets at FYE prior to presentation.  LEV is the leverage at FYE 
prior to presentation.  STD is the standard deviation of stock returns (from CRSP) for year prior to presentation.  
BETA is the beta (from CRSP) of the stock for year prior to presentation.  LTIME is the log of one plus the number 
of years the company has been listed. We include year and industry fixed effects but do not report them in the table. 
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TABLE 5 
Mean and Median Changes in Analyst Following and Institutional Holdings for Quarters 
Subsequent to the Presentation Date 
 
 
Variable Mean Median Pct. > 0 N 
CNANL2 0.201
***
 0.000
***
 39.4% 94,321 
CNANL4 0.326
***
 0.000
***
 44.9% 91,860 
     
CPIH2 0.017
***
 0.010
***
 59.5% 94,321 
CPIH4 0.028
***
 0.020
***
 62.5% 91,860 
 
 
*, **, *** Significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, using a two-tailed test 
(means) and a Wilcoxon signed rank test (medians). 
 
Table 5 presents means and medians for changes in analyst following and institutional holdings for two and four 
quarters after the conference presentation (quarter 0).  NANL is the number of unique analysts issuing earnings 
forecasts for any horizon for the firm during a calendar quarter.  CNANL2 is the difference between NANL in the 
first full calendar quarter after the presentation and the quarter prior to the presentation.  Similarly, CNANL4 is the 
difference between NANL three full calendar quarters after the presentation and the quarter prior to the presentation 
(i.e., the same calendar quarters one year apart).  PIH is the percentage ownership by institutional investors, defined 
as total shares owned by institutions divided by the total shares outstanding.  CPIH2 is the difference between PIH 
at the end of the calendar quarter subsequent to the presentation and the end of the quarter prior to the presentation.  
CPIH4 is the difference between PIH three full calendar quarters after the presentation and the quarter prior to the 
presentation (i.e., the same calendar quarters one year apart).  
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TABLE 6 
Regressions of Changes in Analyst Following and Institutional Holdings Subsequent to the 
Presentation Date on Conference Characteristics and Control Variables 
 
Variable CNANL2 CNANL4  CPIH2 CPIH4 
DPRODMKT -0.116
***
 -0.263
***
  -0.001 -0.001 
DCAPMKT_TOP -0.064
**
 -0.062
*
  0.002
*
 0.005
***
 
DDEST -0.025 0.020  0.003 0.000 
DMONCEN 0.011 -0.059  0.000 0.001 
DNONUS -0.138
**
 -0.153
*
  -0.004
*
 -0.006
*
 
LCONFSIZE 0.006 0.020  0.001
**
 0.002
**
 
DINDUS_CONF 0.044 0.130
***
  0.000 -0.001 
LPRIORPRES 0.177
***
 0.341
***
  0.002
***
 0.003
***
 
 
 
 
  
 DINFO_EVENT -0.029 -0.027  -0.002
***
 -0.003
**
 
LMV 0.153
***
 0.250
***
  -0.004
***
 -0.006
***
 
PIH 1.028
***
 1.646
***
  -0.098
***
 -0.151
***
 
LNANL -0.818
***
 -1.440
***
  0.009
***
 0.014
***
 
ANNMAR 0.475
***
 0.934
***
  0.018
***
 0.023
***
 
ANNTURN 0.774
***
 1.129
***
  -0.011
**
 -0.029
***
 
DFORFIRM 0.065 -0.013  -0.033
***
 -0.050
***
 
ABN_SAR -0.039
***
 -0.058
***
  -0.003
***
 -0.003
***
 
ABN_TURN 0.031
***
 0.056
***
  0.002
***
 0.002
***
 
SAR 0.451
***
 1.240
***
  0.076
***
 0.099
***
 
EP 0.682
***
 1.122
***
  0.050
***
 0.093
***
 
DP 0.534 -0.525  -0.182
***
 -0.286
***
 
BP -0.552
***
 -0.913
***
  0.006
***
 0.011
***
 
CNI -0.274
***
 -0.464
***
  -0.001 0.000 
SGR 0.078
***
 0.047  -0.002
**
 -0.005
***
 
SPINDX -0.099
***
 -0.096  0.008
***
 0.013
***
 
INTAN -0.070 -0.221  0.002 -0.001 
LEV -0.185
***
 -0.142  0.014
***
 0.024
***
 
STD -3.278
*
 -8.470
***
  -0.360
***
 -0.313
***
 
BETA 0.160
***
 0.250
***
  0.002 0.004
**
 
LTIME -0.136
***
 -0.219
***
  -0.004
***
 -0.006
***
 
YEAR EFFECTS Included Included  Included Included 
INDUSTRY EFFECTS Included Included  Included Included 
N 94,321 91,860  94,321 91,860 
Adjusted R
2
 0.090 0.136  0.060 0.082 
 
*, **, *** Significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, using a two-tailed test 
based on two-way clustered standard errors, with clustering at the firm and conference level and bootstrapping using 
the jackknife method 
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TABLE 6 (Continued) 
Regressions of Changes in Analyst Following and Institutional Holdings Subsequent to the 
Presentation Date on Conference Characteristics and Control Variables 
 
Table 6 provides regressions of changes in analyst following and institutional holdings on conference and firm 
characteristics.  NANL is the number of unique analysts issuing earnings forecasts for any horizon for the firm.  
CNANL2 (CNANL4) is the difference between NANL in the first (third) full calendar quarter after the presentation 
and the quarter prior to the presentation.  PIH is the percentage ownership by institutional investors, defined as total 
shares owned by institutions divided by the total shares outstanding.  CPIH2 (CPIH4) is the difference between PIH 
at the end of the first (third) calendar quarter subsequent to the presentation and the end of the quarter prior to the 
presentation.  DPRODMKT equals 1 if the presentation was at a product market-focused conference, 0 otherwise.  
DCAPMKT_TOP equals 1 if the presentation was at a top brokerage firm, 0 otherwise.  DDEST equals 1 if the 
presentation was at a destination location, 0 otherwise.  DNONUS equals 1 if the presentation was held outside of 
the U.S., 0 otherwise.  DMONCEN equals 1 if the presentation was at a money center location, 0 otherwise. 
LCONFSIZE is the log of one plus the number of presentations that occur at the conference. DINDUS_CONF equals 
1 if the presentation was at an industry-focused conference, 0 otherwise.  We define an industry-focused conference 
as having fewer than four industries represented at the conference.  LPRIORPRES is the log of one the number of 
conference presentations given by the firm in the past ninety days.  DINFO_EVENT equals 1 if an earnings 
announcement, management forecast, and/or Form 8-K filing (including Form 6-K filings for foreign registrants) 
occurred within the three-day window surrounding the presentation, 0 otherwise.  LMV is the log of the market value 
in millions (from CRSP) measured 30 days before the conference presentation.  PIH is the percentage ownership by 
institutional investors, defined as total shares owned by institutions divided by the total shares outstanding, for the 
most recent calendar quarter end prior to the conference presentation.  LNANL is the log of one plus the number of 
unique analysts issuing an earnings forecast for any horizon during the calendar quarter prior to the conference 
presentation.  For both PIH and LNANL, we assume the variable has a value of zero for any period when the 
company is listed on an exchange but there is no data available.  ANNMAR is the buy-and-hold market-adjusted 
stock return over the year prior to 30 days before the presentation.  ANNTURN is the average monthly share 
turnover, computed as volume divided by shares outstanding, for the year prior to 30 days before the presentation.  
DFORFIRM is an indicator variable set to 1 if the company is headquartered outside the U.S., 0 otherwise.  
ABS_SAR is the absolute value of size-adjusted returns, defined as the absolute value of three-day size-adjusted 
returns less the mean absolute value of three-day size-adjusted returns during estimation period, divided by the 
standard deviation of the absolute values during the estimation period. ABN_TURN is the abnormal share turnover, 
defined as the three-day volume divided by shares outstanding, less the average three-day turnover in the estimation 
period, times 100.  The estimation period begins 120 days prior to the presentation and ends 30 days prior to the 
presentation.  SAR is the three-day size-adjusted returns surrounding the presentation.  EP is the earnings-to-price 
ratio at fiscal year-end (FYE) prior to presentation.  DP is the dividend-to-price ratio at FYE prior to presentation.  
BP is the book-to-price ratio at FYE prior to presentation.  CNI is the change in net income, deflated by market 
value at FYE prior to presentation.  SGR is the sales growth at FYE prior to presentation.  SPINDX is the indicator 
for listing on any S&P index at FYE prior to presentation.  INTAN is the intangible assets/total assets at FYE prior to 
presentation.  LEV is the leverage at FYE prior to presentation.  STD is the standard deviation of stock returns (from 
CRSP) for year prior to presentation.  BETA is the beta (from CRSP) of the stock for year prior to presentation.  
LTIME is the log of one plus the number of years the company has been listed.  We include year and industry fixed 
effects but do not report them in the table. 
 
 
 
 
